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Abstract
Background: This study seeks to increase clinical operational efficiency and accelerator beam consistency by
retrospectively investigating the application of statistical process control (SPC) to linear accelerator beam steering
parameters to determine the utility of such a methodology in detecting changes prior to equipment failure
(interlocks actuated).
Methods: Steering coil currents (SCC) for the transverse and radial planes are set such that a reproducibly useful
photon or electron beam is available. SCC are sampled and stored in the control console computer each day
during the morning warm-up. The transverse and radial - positioning and angle SCC for photon beam energies
were evaluated using average and range (Xbar-R) process control charts (PCC). The weekly average and range
values (subgroup n = 5) for each steering coil were used to develop the PCC. SCC from September 2009 (annual
calibration) until two weeks following a beam steering failure in June 2010 were evaluated. PCC limits were
calculated using the first twenty subgroups. Appropriate action limits were developed using conventional SPC
guidelines.
Results: PCC high-alarm action limit was set at 6 standard deviations from the mean. A value exceeding this limit
would require beam scanning and evaluation by the physicist and engineer. Two low alarms were used to indicate
negative trends. Alarms received following establishment of limits (week 20) are indicative of a non-random cause
for deviation (Xbar chart) and/or an uncontrolled process (R chart). Transverse angle SCC for 6 MV and 15 MV
indicated a high-alarm 90 and 108 days prior to equipment failure respectively. A downward trend in this
parameter continued, with high-alarm, until failure. Transverse position and radial angle SCC for 6 and 15 MV
indicated low-alarms starting as early as 124 and 116 days prior to failure, respectively.
Conclusion: Radiotherapy clinical efficiency and accelerator beam consistency may be improved by instituting SPC
methods to monitor the beam steering process and detect abnormal changes prior to equipment failure.
PACS numbers: 87.55n, 87.55qr, 87.56bd
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I. Background
Radiation beam uniformity is one of a number of char-
acteristics required for high energy x-ray beams to be
useful in radiation therapy treatment. Verification of
radiation beam uniformity in a plane perpendicular to
the direction of the beam is particularly important for
linear accelerators [1]. Uniformity must be maintained
independent of the orientation or direction of the beam.
Uniformity can be evaluated using various methods
depending on the accelerator manufacturer’s specifica-
tions. Typically the largest field size is evaluated at a
particular depth in water and uniformity is specified
over the central 80% of the beam. Figure 1 is an idea-
lized two dimensional plot of radiation beam intensity
across a typical accelerator photon beam. Beam unifor-
mity is specified in terms of flatness and symmetry.
Acceptable beam flatness and symmetry is produced by
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designed filter. The accelerated electron beam is steered
to a specific location (position) and exit orientation
( a n g l e )a si ts t r i k e st h et a r g e t( F i g u r e2 ) .B e a ms t e e r i n g
is accomplished using two sets of steering coils. One set
is located on the solenoid of the waveguide (Figure 2)
and the second set is located in the electron beam trans-
port section prior to the beam striking the target (not
shown in Figure 2[2].
The accelerator system evaluates beam uniformity
internally using the ion chambers located below the flat-
tening filter. The beam current measured in each
Figure 1 Idealized radiation beam intensity profile of a typical accelerator produced photon beam. Beam flatness is the maximum plus
and minus variation from the mean beam intensity within the central 80% area of full width half maximum intensity and linear symmetry is
defined as the maximum variation of points symmetric to the central axis.
Figure 2 Schematic diagram of a typical medical linear accelerator. (reproduced from Van Dyk, J. The modern technology of radiation
oncology Madison, WI, USA: Medical Physics Publishing; 1999. p1073.)
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specification results in a system interlock. An active sys-
tem interlock takes the accelerator out of service until
the problem is resolved. This interlock system prevents
hazards that can cause serious injury to the patient or
damage to the equipment. While the interlock system is
extremely important, major interlocks disrupt workflow
and retard clinical efficiency by forcing machine down
time where patients can not be treated.
I nt h i ss t u d yw es e e kt oc h a r a c t e r i z et h ep r o c e s so f
medical linear accelerator beam steering and demon-
strate, retrospectively, the ability to provide a level of
control using the statistical process control (SPC) meth-
odology [3-11]. For a generalized system, process perfor-
mance data varies naturally. The information in the
variation of a process is important for an understanding
of how the process is performing. SPC is primarily a
tool for understanding normal and abnormal variations
[3,4]. SPC is used globally in manufacturing and busi-
ness management to provide an ongoing evaluation of
the stability and/or variability of a process [3,4]. Its suc-
cess rests upon the fact that any process can be mapped
by a series of inputs and outputs. Our ability to measure
and effectively evaluate the variation of a critical subset
of these inputs and outputs can provide an objective
basis for timely intervention to maintain a high quality
product - the desired beam flatness and symmetry for a
medical linear accelerator. The work reported here test
the hypothesis that SPC can ensure consistency of beam
uniformity and indicate when intervention is required to
correct non-uniformity prior to the actuation of a sys-
tem interlock (thus saving valuable machine down time).
II. Materials and Methods
Monitoring of radiation beam flatness and symmetry is
critical to the quality of external beam radiation treat-
ment delivery. It is possible to produce a beam with flat-
ness that is within ± 3% of the central axis dose and has
symmetry that does not exceed 2% across the central
80% of the defined field dimensions (Figure 1) [12]. Var-
ious manufacturers define flatness and symmetry differ-
ently. One common definition (Varian Medical Systems,
Palo Alto, CA) of beam flatness is the maximum plus
and minus variation from the mean beam intensity
within the central 80% area of full width half maximum
intensity. Likewise, linear symmetry is defined as the
maximum variation of points symmetric to the central
axis [13]. Modern linear accelerators utilize interlock
systems to determine if predefined limits have been
exceeded and will not allow the system to continue to
operate once these limits are reached. The accelerator
system used in this study, a 21 EX Varian C-series linac
(Varian Medical Systems, Palo Alto, CA), performs a
self-diagnostic test and creates Morning Checkout (MC)
files during the initial warm-up at the start of each
treatment day. Morning warm-up measurements are
typically made at a single standard gantry angle and the
accelerator feedback system is designed to maintain this
setting as the gantry angle varies. The MC files are
stored on the console computer but are not used for
any specific analysis. Steering coil currents (amperes) for
the transverse and radial plane position and angle steer-
ing coil currents are stored in the MC files.
The Varian 21EX at one of our regional affiliates
experienced down time related to a water leak in the
gantry stand. A fine crack in the water circulation tube
dripped water on the electrical harness. This leak had
persisted for months based on the amount of water
found in the bottom of the stand and the fact that our
records did not indicate any notable change in the water
level. The leak was detected when there was an EXQT
(total asymmetry exceeds 2% of symmetrical adjustment)
interlock fault that would not clear. This interlock is an
indication that the beam symmetry is outside specifica-
tions. Following repair, all beams were scanned and
adjusted to ensure beam flatness, symmetry, and abso-
lute dose outputs were within operating specifications.
Data from September 2009 (annual medical linear
accelerator calibration) until two weeks following the
beam steering failure in June 2010 were evaluated. The
steering coil current (SCC) data were downloaded and
manually extracted to Excel file format. The transverse
and radial - positioning and angle SCC for photon beam
energies were evaluated using average and range (Xbar-
R) process behavior charts (Mintab v16, Minitab, Inc.,
State College, PA). The evaluation was limited to 6 MV
and 15 MV photon beam data only.
A. Process Control Charts (PCC)
To monitor a process, typically two control charts are
created: 1) an average chart for subgroup averages, x,
and 2) a range chart for subgroup ranges, R. The center-
l i n ef o rt h es u b g r o u pa v e r a g ec h a r ti sx,w h i c hi st h e
average of all the subgroup averages. The centerline for
the range chart is R, which is the average of all the sub-
group ranges. The daily recorded SCC (transverse angle,
transverse position, radial angle, and radial position)
values were regrouped into nominal weekly values (sub-
group of size n = 5 days/week). Values from the first 20
weeks were used to calculate the limits (upper control
limit (UCL) and lower control limit (LCL)). The average
chart will have an upper threshold (Au), centerline (Ac)
and lower threshold (Al) [6,7] defined as
Au = x +6
R
d2
√
n
=U C L (1)
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where T = 20 and
dt = mean SCC for treatment week number (t)
Al = x − 6
R
d2
√
n
=L C L
where the factor ‘6’ sets the number of standard devia-
tions for the limit margins and n is equal to 5. Similarly,
the range chart will have an upper threshold (Ru), cen-
terline (Rc) and lower threshold (Rl) [6,7] defined as
Ru =

1+6
d3
d2

R =U C L (2)
Rc = R =[ (

Rt)t=1.....T]/T where Rt =
	
	dtmax − dtmin
	
	
where T = 20 and
dtmax and dtmin = maximum and minimum SCC for
treatment week number (t)
Rl =

1 − 6
d3
d2

R =L C L
The quantities d2 and d3 are correction factors that
reflect the non-normality of the distribution of range
values and also depend on the subgroup size n. The
range limits have an asymmetric distribution about the
mean range because the range is a positively skewed
value and cannot be less than zero. It can be seen from
equations (1) and (2) that only the quantities x, R and
√n need to be computed to set action thresholds for the
process control charts. The implication of exceeding the
average or range chart limits on the process is thor-
oughly presented in SPC literature and an extensive
review is beyond the scope of this work [3-7]. In gen-
eral, data that exceeds the average chart limits suggest a
special or non-random cause and/or an uncontrolled
process, while exceeding the range chart limits indicates
a process that is uncontrolled.
The control limits (UCL and LCL) were set using ± 6
standard deviations from the mean (equations 1 and 2).
The chance of a random normal value exceeding the
limits is extremely small. Typically limits are set using 3
standard deviations encompassing 99.7% of the normal
distribution [4,6,8]. The cost of intervention (machine
downtime, physics and engineering man-hours, scanning
equipment, etc.) is considerable and a higher threshold
limit appeared to be reasonable. Setting the limits at ± 6
standard deviations encompasses 99.9999998% of the
normal distribution. The probability of a Type I error (a
signal indicating an alarm incorrectly) is reduced and
therefore the cost of unwarranted intervention is
reduced as well. While there is an increase in the prob-
ability of a Type II error (a signal indicating there is no
alarm when in fact a problem exist), this risk is balanced
and offset by the existence of the interlock system. The
data analysis was also performed using the 3 standard
deviation control limits to gather a baseline understand-
ing of how changing the limits may impact the investi-
gation of or intervention in the process.
There are a number of standard tests other than the
UCL and LCL that can be applied to PCC that assist in
detecting a change in the process resulting from special
causes or conditions [3,4],
a. k number of points in a row, on the same side of
the center line
b. k number of points in a row, all increasing or
decreasing
c. k number of points in a row, alternating up and
down
d. k out of k+1 points,> 2 standard deviations from
the center line on the same side
e. k out of k+1 points > 1 standard deviation from
the center line on the same side
f. k number of points in a row within 1 standard
deviation from the center line on either side
g. k number of points in a row > 1 standard devia-
tion from the center line on either side
These can be considered as low-alarm or warning
indicators. Low-alarm indicators represent a trend with
a specific probability. Determining which low-alarm
indicators to apply can be decided by using historical
data to create a run chart. A run chart is simply a plot
of individual or subgroup data points which allows the
investigator to broadly characterize the process data.
Reviewing the characteristics of the process data
sampled can assist in determining which low alarm indi-
cators may be most useful.
Two low-alarm indicators (a & d) were used in this
study: 1) the observation of nine consecutive weekly
samples on one side of the mean and 2) the observation
of two out of three consecutive weekly samples greater
than two standard deviations from the mean but not
exceeding the UCL or LCL. For the first low-alarm indi-
cator, the probability of a single value on one side of the
mean but not exceeding the limit is 0.5. The probability
of nine in a row is (0.5)
9 or ~ 0.002. The chance of this
occurring is similar to a single value exceeding 3 stan-
dard deviations. For the second low-alarm indicator, the
probability of a single value on one side of the mean
being less than two standard deviations from the mean
is 0.475. Also the probability of a single value on one
side of the mean being greater than two standard
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this low-alarm is then (0.475 × 0.025 × 0.025) or 0.0003.
This alarm indicates a lack of process control and an
acute shift in the mean. It is a powerful warning indica-
tor whose probability of occurrence is smaller than that
of a single value exceeding 3 standard deviations.
III. Results and discussion
Figure 3 and 4 are the SPC results of the transverse
angle SCC for the 6 MV and 15 MV beams, respectively.
The high-alarm action limit is indicated by a 1 below a
red data point. The low-alarms are indicated by a 2
[ n i n ew e e k l ys a m p l e so no n es i d eo ft h em e a n ]o ra5
Figure 3 Process control charts (average and range charts) for 6 MV photon beam transverse angle steering coil current. Note: Red
data points indicate an alarm has been signaled. Valid alarms occur after the first 20 data points which establish the calculated control limits.
Figure 4 Process control charts (average and range charts) for 15 MV photon beam transverse angle steering coil current. Note: Red
data points indicate an alarm has been signaled. Valid alarms occur after the first 20 data points which establish the calculated control limits.
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than two standard deviations from the mean] below a
red data point respectively. SPC analysis of transverse
angle SCC for 6 MV and 15 MV indicated a high-alarm
on April 14
th and March 13
th - 90 and 108 days prior to
failure, respectively. In each case, a downward trend in
this parameter continued, with high-alarm, until failure.
Transverse position (Figure 5 and 6) and radial angle
SCC for both energies indicated a low-alarm starting in
March or April. Transverse position SCC results show
sensitivity similar to the transverse angle results. Analy-
sis of the SCC in the radial plane did not indicate the
same sensitivity as early as the SCC in the transverse
plane. All the results are summarized in Figure 7 and
show the number of days prior to failure that an alarm
was triggered.
Figure 5 Process control charts (average and range charts) for 6 MV photon beam transverse position steering coil current. Note: Red
data points indicate an alarm has been signaled. Valid alarms occur after the first 20 data points which establish the calculated control limits.
Figure 6 Process control charts (average and range charts) for 15 MV photon beam transverse position steering coil current. Note: Red
data points indicate an alarm has been signaled. Valid alarms occur after the first 20 data points which establish the calculated control limits.
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Page 6 of 9Figure 7 Process control chart warning results. Bars indicate the number of days prior to failure that an action level threshold was first
triggered for each of the monitored steering coil parameters. A - High Alarm triggered indicating parameters exceeding ± 6 standard deviations
of the mean weekly sample value. B - Low alarm indicating the observation of nine consecutive weekly samples on one side of the mean. C -
Low alarm indicating the observation of two out of three consecutive weekly samples greater than two standard deviations from the mean but
not exceeding the high alarm limit.
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deviations versus 6 standard deviations primarily indi-
cates:
a. Low alarms are changed to high alarms requiring
intervention.
b. There is an increase in the number of Type I
errors observed.
The result of the comparison supports the use of 6
standard deviation control limits for monitoring the
beam steering process.
Subsequent to the repair, continued monitoring using
SPC requires the calculation of new limits based on the
newly established operating SCC. The first twenty sub-
groups would be used to determine new limits and SPC
then continues to monitor and evaluate process
variation.
These results indicate that evaluation of beam steering
currents using SPC would have provided an early indica-
tion of deviations in the current values prior to the
actuation of the interlock and required unscheduled
downtime. Results of the 6 MV transverse angle SCC
results show the first low-alarm (5 - two out of three
points greater than two standard deviations) on March
15, which was 104 days prior to failure with a high-
alarm two weeks later. The low-alarm was fifteen weeks
prior to actuation of the system interlock. The 15 MV
transverse angle SCC show the first low-alarm (5- two
out of three points greater than two standard deviations)
o nM a r c h3 ,w h i c hw a s1 1 6d a y sp r i o rt of a i l u r e ,f o l -
lowed by a high-alarm one week later. These alarms
confirm the diagnosis that the water leak and resulting
damage persisted for a relatively long period of time.
Investigation of this alarm would have initiated sixteen
weeks prior to the actuation of the system interlock.
The radial angle and radial position low-alarms gave the
earliest warnings (124 days). In addition, the low-alarm
indicators were effective in signaling a change in the
established operating SCC of both energies. Overall, the
low-alarm indicating two out of three points greater
than two standard deviations was most effective in pre-
dicting a “permanent” shift in the mean SCC values.
Further study of additional low-alarm indicators may
establish which alarms are most predictive of a clinically
significant change in beam steering.
Typically, standard control limits are calculated using
three standard deviations to balance the cost-benefit as
well as the Type I and II error probability. The use of
six standard deviations for calculating the control chart
limits was particularly economical in our study. The
physics and engineering effort required to investigate a
Type I error is significant. We believe a high threshold
for action is desirable compared to current cost of
unwarranted intervention or investigation.
The use of digital control systems in medical linear
accelerators make them ideal for the incorporation of a
SPC subsystem that can use the performance data gen-
erated to monitor consistency of operation. Quality of
patient treatment delivery can be improved by ensuring
consistent operating parameters relative to the baseline
values determined at the time of accelerator commis-
sioning [14]. The use of an SPC subsystem is non-inva-
sive and simply samples data already generated by the
accelerator. While SPC could be used to alert the physi-
cist and service engineer to a change in operating para-
meters, any use as an active control system would need
to have FDA clearance provided by the manufacturer.
IV. Conclusion
The results of this study suggest that the use of the
investigated SPC methodology with a six standard devia-
tion high-alarm action limit would have prompted an
investigation of the beam steering process prior to a sig-
nificant change in beam flatness and symmetry and
made detection of the water leak responsible for changes
in SCC performance more likely. The impact of machine
downtime on clinical operational efficiency would be
minimized by the scheduling of planned maintenance to
be performed without interruption of the clinic treat-
ment schedule.
System interlocks provide an important safety function
to safeguard the equipment from catastrophic failure
and prevent unsafe clinical use when operating specifi-
cations are exceeded. SPC could be used to detect non-
standard functioning of beam flatness and symmetry
prior to these measurements creating beam interrupts
and altering treatment times and schedules. This early
warning alert could ultimately improve treatment deliv-
ery and clinical operational efficiency. The use of SPC
to evaluate the operating parameters of critical accelera-
tor systems has the potential to improve the quality of
accelerator maintenance, treatment delivery and ulti-
mately patient safety. SPC could be expanded to help
provide a “smart-accelerator” system that communicates
non-standard functioning of systems directly to the local
service representative and physicist if automated.
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